107. Ronfeldt et al., Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico, 37.
108. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions. Revolutions often follow wars for other reasons as well. Walter Laqueur writes that the "general dislocation caused by war, the material losses and human sacrifices, create a climate conducive to radical change. A large section of the population has been armed; human life seems considerably less valuable than in peacetime." See Walter Laqueur, "Revolution," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 13, 501 (New York: Macmillan, 1968).
109. Some conflict analysts combine particular components in order to distinguish different kinds of conflicts. For example, identity conflicts refer to struggles about dissensual issues such as the core values and values held by the contending parties, while interest conflicts are based on what is regarded here as consensual issues. See Jay Rothman, Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organizations, and Communities (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997).

Varieties of Conflict Strategies

The conventional understanding among many partisans and observers of conflicts is that injurious coercion is needed to induce an adversary to change against its will. Violence is often regarded as the last resort to be used in settling an unregulated conflict. As discussed in this chapter, however, even such conflicts can be waged and settled nonviolently and even in noncoercive ways. One side may promise future benefits to an opponent if the opponent yields what it seeks. Or one party may try to convince its adversary that to provide what it requests would be in the adversary’s own true interests. Such noncoercive inducements are likely to be combined with some coercion; but often the coercion is limited and not necessarily destructive of positive relationships between the adversaries.

Each contending party adopts a strategy, or more likely a set of strategies that change in the course of the conflict. Each strategy combines a variety of inducements in a series of short-term tactical actions. Furthermore, in large-scale conflicts each side generally consists of many groups employing different methods, some of which may be complementary, while others are even contradictory. Moreover, since every conflict is interlocked with many others, a group within one contending party is likely to use different strategies with various antagonists, within and outside its camp, and with parties that have diverse stakes in the conflict.

The choice of a strategy does not require that alternatives be consciously considered, their likely effectiveness assessed, or their costs weighed before being selected. At times, a tactic may be used because it appears to be the only reasonable one available and no reflection seems required. But even in those circumstances, alternatives were conceivable and an analyst should consider what they might be and why the parties did not consider them. An examination of the constraints on choice of tactics is a crucial part of any conflict analysis.

Usually, however, in conflicts between large-scale adversaries, alternative strategies are considered, often briefly and in a small circle but sometimes at length and with extensive participation. After all, a conflict strategy is a means
toward a desired goal. Just because one opponent or analyst judges that behavior to be ineffective, counterproductive, or merely expressive does not mean that it is so regarded by those employing it. For example, blacks, but not whites, generally viewed the 1960s riots in urban U.S. ghettos as protest actions that would positively affect public policies. Admittedly, conflict behavior usually does have expressive components, and some members of a conflict party may get intrinsic pleasure from such behavior, even if no change results. Insofar as expressiveness is significant, the strategy usually is not well calculated for its effect, and reaching a constructive ending may become more difficult.

No single party wholly determines how a struggle is conducted; rather, the adversaries jointly shape their mode of struggle. Some conflict modes are highly institutionalized and the adversaries mutually agree to employ one of them, as occurs in cultures with norms regarding duels, feuds, strikes, judicial proceedings, and so on. Some conflict modes may not be so clearly guided by rules, but the adversaries recognize that they are conducting a struggle in an agreed-on mode, such as waging a war. In some struggles, however, the parties disagree about what mode is being used; one side may proclaim it is engaging in respectful petition or protest, while the other regards the conduct as an unlawful threat to authority and violently represses it, as occurred at Tiananmen Square, Beijing, in June 1989.

**TYPES OF INDUCEMENTS**

To examine the adoption and the consequences of different modes in diverse conflicts, it is useful to consider the basic inducements that are combined to constitute different modes. Three basic inducements are generally recognized: coercion, reward, and persuasion. Distinguishing among the inducements requires criteria to identify them, but analysts use different criteria, yielding different identifications. The criteria include: the actors’ intentions, the recipients’ perceptions, the analysts’ characterization of effects, or the way the actions are presented by those performing them. The way actions are presented is relatively ascertainable and therefore usually will be the criterion used here; but its use does not preclude consideration of other ways of distinguishing inducements.

**Coercive Inducements**

Coercion is a major element of the struggles examined here. It refers to actions, including symbolic ones, which injure or threaten to injure the adversary; they are presented as efforts to intimidate and deter the opponent or to force the opponent to comply with the demands made by the coercer. The cessation of coercion, then, is conditional on the opponent’s compliance and is not carried out for its intrinsic satisfaction only.

Among the many forms and degrees that coercive inducements have, one significant difference is between threatened and actualized coercion. Coercion is generally threatened before being applied, in the hope that the threat will coerce. The term “violent coercive inducement” refers to threatened or actual direct physical death or injury to people or destruction of part of their valued material world. This conventional notion is useful for the present analysis, but the concept of violence to include actions or inactions by some people such that realizations are below their potential realizations. Johan Galtung argues for broadening “human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental reasons that, “if people are starving when that is objectively avoidable, then violence is committed.” On the other hand, for many people, even killings may not be regarded as violent when they are done by legitimate authorities. For some members of the public, the use of force is regarded as necessary to maintain law and order and consequently is not considered to be violent. In our analysis, however, the use or threatened use of force to injure others is called violence, whoever does it.

The magnitude of coercive inducements varies greatly, but not along a single dimension. A high level of coercion is evident when force is used to change the conditions of the target group, most extremely by extensive killing of group members, as in cases of genocide. Actions directly changing conditions also include forced removal of people from their accustomed territory. More typically, coercion is used against some members of the opposing sides, thus weakening and intimidating enough of the other side so that the entire body is obliged to comply. It includes attacks against the other side’s military forces but also against leading figures of the opposing side, taking the form of police repression of individuals that includes torture and “disappearances.” Nonviolent coercion, such as boycotts or economic sanctions, are generally considered to be of lower magnitude than violent coercion. At a lower level of coercion, a threat may be made to withhold payment or services on which the other party depends. For example, where employees have few options, even an unrealized threat by an employer can be quite effective. In valued personal relations, the mere expression of disapproval or anger is also perceived as coercive.

Coercive inducements also vary in their cost to the user. Threats may seem cheap, but to be effective they must appear credible to the threatened. That means the party making the threat must seem capable and willing to execute powerful military force that credibly could not be deterred or defeated by the threatened government, and that would be a very expensive burden on society’s economy. Actually carrying out a threat can be even more costly, both in terms of exercising the coercion and suffering the consequences of retribution. Failing to follow through with a threat, when compliance is not won, is also costly, damaging future credibility with constituents as well as external adversaries and allies. The costs of various strategies affect the choice among them and impose constraints on escalating and prolonging a conflict.
Furthermore, coercion is often a very uncertain and imprecise means of inducing an adversary to change. Typically, in large-scale conflicts trying to induce the leaders of the adversary to change involves subjecting their constituents to massive coercion. Such coercion may turn counterproductive as the initially wavering constituency rallies to support their leadership against the attacker. The use of broad and unselective coercion, then, tends to widen the conflict, add to its destructiveness, and sometimes prolong it. Finally, the resulting animosities and destruction severely hampers the attainment of mutually agreeable relations afterward.

Rewards as Inducements

Although rewards are not obvious conflict inducements, they are commonly used, but are relatively neglected in the analysis of social conflicts. In child rearing and learning generally, an extensive body of theory and research indicates the value of rewards rather than punishments. In these areas, offering a reward for compliance can be more effective and precise than punishing for noncompliance. This principle is also observable in large-scale conflicts. For example, in the early 1990s the U.S. government had become deeply concerned about North Korea's nuclear program and sought UN approval for strong economic sanctions. By June 1994, plans to attack North Korea's nuclear facilities were prepared. The danger of a war was averted when former President Jimmy Carter went to North Korea and persuaded Kim Il Sung, North Korea's leader, to freeze the nuclear program. The U.S. and North Korean governments then conducted negotiations leading to the October 1994 Agreed Framework, according to which North Korea would roll back its nuclear arms program and the United States would gradually normalize political and economic relations, help replace nuclear reactors, and supply heavy fuel oil. The effectiveness of this strategy was not fully tested since the policy was changed by the incoming administration of President George W. Bush early in 2001.

The prior U.S. policy had been pursued in the context of the South Korean "Sunshine Policy" of dialogue and reconciliation toward North Korea, which had been initiated by South Korean president Kim Dae Jung following his election in 1992. President Bush rebuffed this South Korean policy, when President Kim Dae Jung visited the newly elected U.S. president in March 2001. U.S. rhetorical attacks on North Korea continued and North Korea was included with Iraq and Iran in the "Axis of Evil" denounced by the U.S. president in his State of the Union message of January 2002. Sanctions were threatened to induce North Korea to cease any nuclear weapons program, but this largely coercive strategy failed to halt the North Korean program.

Positive sanctions are more likely to be used and to be effective in the closing stages of a conflict than during a period of escalation or of intense antagonism. Offers of benefits while a conflict is being waged with great coerciveness tend to be regarded with suspicion by the recipient. An exchange of benefits, such as of prisoners on each side, however, may be a way of signaling the possibility of eventually normalizing relations.

Even while a conflict is in progress, one party may offer or provide material benefits as an inducement to obtain what it seeks. Benefits may include money, land, or promises of access to occupational positions. In addition, positive sanctions include intangible benefits such as approval or status recognition. This means that the side with greater resources is more capable of using positive sanctions. The U.S. government is particularly strong in these regards.

As is true for negative sanctions, the recipients of positive sanctions vary in susceptibility. To complicate matters, certain individuals or factions within the opposing side in large-scale conflicts are more likely to obtain the benefits than are others. More extremely, the benefits may be covertly offered to the leaders of the opposing side, knowing that acceptance would be regarded as corruption or treason. Sometimes collective bargaining agreements are considered "sweetheart contracts," when the contract terms offer little to the workers, and imply that the union negotiator has received side payments from the management.

Finally, rewards can be part of a general strategy that transforms a conflict. One side, with more of what is the basis of contention, may provide enough to the other side that the conflict is transformed. In many capitalist countries, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, class conflict was a fundamental struggle between workers and the owners of the industries where the workers were employed. The class conflict erupted in some countries in bloody revolutions, many of which were violently suppressed. Yet gradually in most of these countries, governments began to implement social welfare policies and laws to protect workers, largely with the acquiescence of the dominant economic class. Members of the wealthy class in those countries saw that the stability of the society so purchased would be to their benefit as well as to the workers' benefit. In part this recognition was the result of coercion, but also of the persuasive efforts of the workers and their middle-class allies.

Persuasive Inducements

Persuasive inducements are couched as efforts to influence an opponent by communicating arguments, information, or appeals to alter the other side's perception of the conflict. If effective, the receiver becomes convinced of the value of the sender's goal for itself as well and accepts it. Persuasive inducements are frequently used in conflict, but often they are accompanied by some degree of coercion.

Although persuasive inducements are readily observed in social relations, the analysis of their role in conflicts has been limited, perhaps because antagonists rarely acknowledge that the enemy has convinced them of anything. Yet, since conflicts arise and persist only because adversaries believe they have incompatible goals, persuasion can play a significant role in the emergence, escalation, and transformation of conflicts. Persuasive efforts are likely to be
more effective at the initial stages of conflict emergence, before mutual mistrust has intensified. Later, as a conflict enters a de-escalating phase, they may be renewed as one or both sides try to convince the other that belief in the incompatibility of their goals is misguided or that their common interests should be given higher priority. The resulting reframing of the conflict marks its transformation, and may be aided by a mediator's redefinitions and restructuring.  

Persuasive inducements vary widely in content, depending on who is trying to influence whom, what the issues in contention are, and the stage the struggle has reached. Persuasive efforts may be couched in appeals to shared values about justice, fairness, or freedom. The other side, sharing those values, is urged to be true to them and concede what is being sought. Leaders of a primary adversary or of other parties with a stake in the fight, or even of intermediary groups, may also stress that the adversaries have common or complementary interests and furthermore that those interests would be well served by making what previously had been regarded as concessions.

Adversaries who become convinced that they have a common enemy have a reason to moderate or even settle their conflict with each other and form a coalition to confront their shared enemy. One of the adversaries may persuade the other of the salience of this shared antagonist, or an intermediary may try to persuade two antagonists about the dangers from a third party. It is also possible that the adversaries become convinced that they have an opportunity for mutual gain by cooperation, such as joint exploitation of petroleum or water resources. Finally, the adversaries may be persuaded to recognize they share a problem that can best be overcome by their joint efforts; the problem may be an environmental risk or the waste of their resources in a mutually destructive struggle. Thus, although labor unions and environmental organizations often are in contention, pitting interests in jobs against protecting the environment, collaborative alliances sometimes are made between them. This happened during a strike of the United Paperworkers International Union (UPIU) against a papermaking company in Jay, Maine, 1987–1988. The townpeople had long endured the effects of toxic waste from the company’s paper mills when two disasters caused grave environmental damage, revealing links between the company’s environmental and labor policies. The UPIU and Greenpeace formed a lasting alliance, which resulted in passage of the state’s first environmental ordinance enabling the town of Jay to enforce environmental regulations.

Another kind of persuasive argument a contending party may use is that what it wants does not endanger the adversary. For example, it may argue that the autonomy or access to resources that it seeks would not adversely affect the other party. This might be argued in terms of shared values or norms of fairness, pointing out that in similar circumstances, the adversary would make the same claims. The contending party’s leaders may ask the adversary to consider what its claim looks like from its perspective.

Finally, persuasive inducements may provide information to convince the opponent that agreement would be advantageous to them. The information is likely to be expressed as predictions of future losses or forgone gains if the other side does not change as desired. Predictions of future losses, generally called warnings, foretell terrible consequences, but only if those matters are not under the persuader’s control. If they are, the predictions are regarded as threats. For example, leaders of a protesting organization may point out that if they fail to get what they seek, another leadership or a rival organization will take over and be even more hostile. Information may also come in the form of forecasting future benefits if the opponent changes and agrees to concede; for example, other groups would praise them. If what is predicted is under control of the party making the predictions, it is a promise; when it is not, it has been called a mendation.

These persuasive inducements have been discussed as symbolic communications, using a verbal or written language. The appeals, arguments, and information, however, also can be conveyed in other formats. Cultural products such as paintings, songs, photographs, films, and videos can be used persuasively with great effectiveness, especially in efforts by leaders to mobilize their own constituency. In relations between adversaries, it may be that members of one contending party will try to bypass the leadership and convince the rank and file of the other side.

In conflict relations, partisans often say that actions speak louder than words. Indeed, appeals, arguments, and information frequently are more convincingly conveyed by the contending party’s behavior than by what it says. The gestures, policies, and a thousand other kinds of actions by members of a contending party are observed and interpreted by the other side and provide credibility to the words uttered. Thus, we cannot fully separate persuasive inducements from other kinds of inducements. In any particular mode of waging a conflict, positive and negative sanctions tend to be combined with persuasive efforts. Thus, in a war, psychological techniques are used to encourage enemy soldiers to surrender. During the East-West Cold War, each side used various propaganda methods to undermine support of the other’s leadership. In the American struggle against al Qaeda and similar jihadist groups, persuasive efforts are widely recognized as vital to deny those groups support from Muslims. Official and unofficial groups, however, have decried the inadequacies of the public diplomacy campaigns of President George W. Bush’s administrations.

The three kinds of inducements—coercion, reward, and persuasion—have been discussed as direct and explicit ways of trying to affect an opponent. But these efforts may also be indirect, in which case we speak of covert actions and of efforts to manipulate the opposing side. For example, one side may try to subvert or reduce adversary leaders’ constituency support by covert operations such as secretly supporting publications and organizations opposing the leaders on the other side. Or one side may try to influence a third party to reduce its support for the opposing side, as may be undertaken in a public relations campaign.
Chapter 4

STRATEGIES AND MODES OF STRUGGLE

Coercive and noncoercive inducements are combined in many ways to construct particular tactics, strategies, and modes of conflict. They may be short-term tactics such as a protest march or long-term strategies such as a guerrilla war. The long-term strategy incorporates many tactics, sets of them generally conducted in sequence. Each adversary adopts particular strategies, sometimes with little reflection, and as the adversaries struggle against each other, they fashion a specific mode of conflict. But many modes have generally recognized and familiar characteristics. Adversaries may agree, for example, that a particular action is part of "collective bargaining." They then share certain expectations about what the other side will do, and both feel constrained not to act outside the mutually understood rules. Sometimes adversaries disagree about what mode of struggle is being used; one side may say it is engaged in a struggle for national liberation, and the other asserts that a small terrorist band is challenging legitimate authorities. When there are such disagreements, the adversaries obviously are little constrained by shared rules.

Modes of conflict, as social constructions, are a kind of social invention. Think of legal systems, which are collectively enacted to provide procedures by which many disputes and conflicts are conducted and settled within a society. Even wars may be considered social constructs; as Margaret Mead observes, war is an institution that was invented.27

The various ways by which struggles are conducted are presented here in terms of a fundamental dimension: the degree to which the means of conflict are regulated and institutionalized. I will also note how they vary in combining different inducements. These variations affect how destructive or constructive a struggle may become.

Institutionalized Conflict Regulation

Since social conflicts are omnipresent, every social system has contrived ways to manage them.28 Within all societies, there are rules for conducting and settling conflicts, and these tend to be institutionalized. The judicial system in most countries implements regulations regarding disputes between individuals and/or corporate entities. The decision makers in these systems tend not to be the disputants themselves, but authorities such as judges, juries, or heads of religious or political organizations. Adversaries generally pursue and resolve conflicts by their own actions within the confines of such institutionalized regulations, as when management-union contentions are conducted by the parties according to laws about fair labor practices and collective bargaining.

Even disputes about how the social system itself should act are generally conducted within agreed-on structures of governance. Most societies have governmental organizations whose officers have the authority to make decisions regarding collective actions. In many democratic societies and organizations, the incumbents have competed for those offices in an electoral process, having taken different positions about policy issues. Such electoral politics may be so habitual and so well regulated that contesting political parties are not regarded as being in a social conflict, except metaphorically. By the definition used in this book, however, they are in conflict.

Conflicts that are not waged according to established rules are of most interest here. It is useful, nevertheless, to also examine regulated conflicts because fights often break out of those regulated bounds, and it is important to understand how that happens and how such conflicts sometimes escalate destructively. It is also useful to understand how previously destructive conflicts become legitimately regulated. Examining the variations in conflict regulation and institutionalization will further such understanding.

Degree of Regulation

As previously noted, rules often govern in great detail many aspects of adversarial conduct, which can be true even for conflicts waged with deadly violence. Thus, in many societies quarreling men have fought duels in which careful protocol was followed, which might result in a death. Wars in some historical periods have been waged with considerable restrictions, compared with the relatively unlimited wars of the last two centuries. For example, in European wars between about 1640 and 1740 fighting was halted to gather the harvest.29

With the establishment of large armies of conscripts at the end of the eighteenth century and the development of mechanized war fighting in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the scale of wars, the capabilities of killing people, and the deaths inflicted upon civilians grossly increased, reaching extreme levels in World War I. More war horrors followed. World War II was waged as a "total" war, with "terror" bombing of cities in Poland, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan, culminating in the use of nuclear bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Populations were forced into extremely harsh labor camps, and millions were murdered, reaching the horrors of the Holocaust.

In response to the horrors of World War I, World War II, and the large-scale killings in internal wars and genocides, numerous treaties, international resolutions, and other efforts were made during the twentieth century to prevent and restrain particular ways of killing people. These treaties and understandings have been widely accepted and they have been largely observed.30 Thus, since the dropping of two atom bombs in 1945, neither nuclear nor bacteriological weapons have been employed in warfare. Chemical weapons have generally not been used since World War I; however, in 1988 during the Iraqi-Iranian war, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons on Kurdish citizens of Iraq.31 Chemicals were also used as a defoliating agent by U.S. military forces in the war in Vietnam.

Normative constraints and institutionalized regulations have helped contain the development, deployment, and use of potentially horrific weapons. In addition, the widely agreed-upon constraints are sustained by threats of sanctions and fear of retaliation, as well as doubts about the effectiveness of chemical
and bacteriological weapons. The importance of broadly recognized legitimate authority in constraining gross human rights violations is also evident by the violations that occur in the absence of such authority. This is evident during civil wars and revolutions, as illustrated by the grotesque brutality of genocidal attacks in Rwanda in 1994 and the "ethnic cleansing" by rape, torture, and killing in Croatia and Bosnia in the former Yugoslavia in 1993–1995. The existence of a government exercising control in a country does not in itself ensure the protection of human rights for the people in that country. Many of the worst atrocities in modern human experience have been conducted by government leaders against their own people, claiming legitimate authority and promising a future utopia; this is epitomized by the imprisonment and killing of millions of people by the totalitarian regimes of the Soviet Union headed by Joseph Stalin, of Nazi Germany headed by Adolf Hitler, of the People's Republic of China led by Mao Zedong, and of the Cambodian Khmer Rouge headed by Pol Pot.

The content of rules governing conflict engagement is crucial. International norms regarding human rights and democracy have influenced the rules established in countries that are in transition away from authoritarian control. The rules often help provide safeguards for individual and group security and also procedures to challenge the privileges of the dominant political party, class, ethnicity, or other groups. Many international governmental and nongovernmental organizations are influential in helping establish such rules, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations Development Programme, and the European Union.

The term "conflict regulation" refers to the rules that govern the contending parties' conduct in a dispute. But rules that are unilaterally imposed cannot be regarded as regulations; nor can policies that allow one party to violently suppress another and that are used as a mask for partisan struggle be called regulations. Authentic regulation exists insofar as the contending parties recognize each other's legitimacy and regard the rules governing their conflict as legitimate.

Degree of Institutionalization

Institutionalized rules of conflict are generally sanctioned by legitimate authority, appear to exist external to those in conflict, and are internalized by members of the contending parties. The existence of legitimate sanctions to reward compliance and punish violations are crucial elements of the institutionalization of the regulations and their maintenance. Sanctions that may be threatened or promised, by officials, religious leaders, charismatic leaders, or friends, include fines, incarceration, condemnations, acclaim, or even the promise of everlasting life in heaven.

The effectiveness of such sanctions depends not only on their magnitude, but also on the certainty of their implementation. That likelihood of enforcement is increased insofar as it appears in the interest and capability of particular per-
are great, the dominant party may largely impose rules governing conflict behavior.

The particular characteristics of the contending parties also affect the development of conflict rules and their institutionalization. Thus, the culture of a party affects the likelihood that some procedures and not others will be considered legitimate and amenable to institutionalization. Many of the Catalan people in Spain, for example, think of themselves as “deal makers” who have always tended to negotiate about issues in dispute. They offer that as an explanation for their successful negotiated achievement of regional autonomy. More generally, in Western societies disputants in a controversy tend to have internalized expectations that disputes only have winners and losers, and their contentious behavior is guided by that expectation. In many traditional societies, and often in Asian cultures, generally the goal is to restore harmonious relations between the contending parties, and participants and intermediaries have internalized those expectations so that conflict becomes a search for resolutions that will enable the parties to resume coexistence in reasonable tranquility.

The social system in which the contending parties belong profoundly affects the content and institutionalization of conflict rules. Legitimate agents of an overarching social system foster and may even impose rules governing conflict between constituent contending parties. Political philosophers have long pointed to the vital role of governments in solving one of the inherent problems of social life: the threat of unbridled conflict. The absence of supranational institutions to govern how a fight is waged contributes to the violence of international conflicts, as stressed by “realists” in international relations.

Increasingly, however, international treaties and institutions govern, however imperfectly, spheres of social, political, economic, and military affairs, notably evident in the area of human rights violations. The establishment and functioning of the International Court of Justice, ad hoc tribunals, and the International Criminal Court are illustrative of that trend.

Globalization, in its many dimensions, not only helps in ameliorating large-scale conflicts, but also unleashes and exacerbates such conflicts. Groups from different societies that lack shared understandings encounter each other and generate intense antagonisms with few shared rules about how to handle the consequent conflicts. The reaction of some Muslim fundamentalists to Western influence can spur efforts to revitalize Islam transnationally. Consequently, transnational networks, such as al Qaeda, can emerge, whose members, based on their own self-reinforcing understandings, can feel justified in extreme attacks against alien others.

Finally, the kind of issues in contention profoundly affects the degree to which conflict behavior is controlled by institutionalized regulations. For example, conflicts in which the contending parties do not think their vital interests or fundamental identities are at stake tend to be relatively susceptible to institutionalized regulation. Also, some contentious issues seem relatively indivisible, which makes them more amenable to negotiated resolution.

ILLUSTRATIVE STRATEGIES

To illustrate how coercive, rewarding, and persuasive inducements may be combined in various ways to constitute a strategy of struggle, I discuss five sets of strategies that employ different combinations of inducements. The strategic approaches are reframing enactments (Re), nonviolent actions (Nv), terrorist actions (Tr), coengagements (Ce), and problem-solving meetings (Ps). See figure 4.1.

Reframing Enactments (Re)

Persons in stable relations generally share expectations and understandings about their interactions, viewing them from similar subjective frames. Those understandings in turn sustain their patterns of peaceful interaction. Members of a conflict party may try to change those relations by trying to get the others to agree that the relations should indeed be viewed in a new way. They may try to persuade others to recognize the validity of this new perspective and they may act to interrupt the old patterns and thus bring about a new framing of the relationship. But to affect others to change the social relationship usually
requires more than persuasive words, it also requires a change in circumstances so that the old way of thinking loses its seeming inevitability.

The profound revolution in relations between men and women that began in the 1960s in the United States and elsewhere in the world is in good measure the result of a reframing enactment strategy with a large persuasive component. See “Re(1)” in figure 4.1. Changing economic and social conditions provided the bases for the rapid growth and acceptance among many women of new feminist thinking.34 Betty Friedan’s book *The Feminine Mystique,* published in 1963, was vastly influential. Soon, a torrent of books and articles documented the ongoing inequities of women’s social position and held out the vision of a society without rigid gender roles and with equal rights for women and men. Individual women and small groups of women interrupted, in innumerable ways and places, the previously traditional ways men treated women. In a remarkably short time, laws were enacted and new ways of thinking and behaving became evident among men as well as women. Such a radical and relatively fast change suggests that the new feminist ideas fit new social conditions very well and the props supporting traditional patriarchal thinking were already weakened. The partisans of the struggle for equal rights also achieved so many gains due to the ingenuity of their tactics and to the persuasive argument made by many feminists that men as well as women would benefit by being liberated from prescribed gender roles.

 Obviously, everything that feminists envisioned in the early years of the women’s movement in the United States has not been realized. Moreover, some of what was achieved has generated new problems and conflicts. Consequently, the struggle for equality continues, but the struggle has been transformed and in a significant degree has become institutionalized in a transformed country (see table 10.1 and discussion in chapter 10).

The struggle of the Zapatistas in Mexico, noted in chapter 3, provides another illustration of reframing enactments, opening with major coercive components; see “Re(2)” in figure 4.1. The immediate response of the Mexican government to the armed uprising in Chiapas that began on January 1, 1994, was to militarily suppress the uprising.35 Troops were dispatched and shots were exchanged; then the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN; Zapatista National Liberation Army) disappeared into the jungle, and the army pursued it. However, by January 12 Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the president of Mexico, declared a unilateral cease-fire and called on the Zapatistas to put down their arms and negotiate. Indeed, on February 21 peace talks began.

The speed with which the Mexican government ceased its military efforts to suppress an armed insurgency by the EZLN deserves attention. Aspects of the social and political context and of the EZLN strategy contributed to this surprising reaction. For several years, a variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) had been rapidly increasing in Mexico, many working in the area of human rights generally and particularly of indigenous peoples’ rights. They had formed worldwide links by electronic means of communication so that news of the events in Chiapas quickly spread within and beyond Mexico. The network made possible a rapid mobilization of people in support the EZLN. Furthermore, the message of the Zapatistas was articulated with stunning clarity and reasonableness, by one of the leading EZLN figures, Subcomandante Marcos. His analyses of the terrible conditions of indigenous peoples and his ways of correcting them were written in a style that delighted and enlightened the intellectuals of Mexico City and were sent out via e-mail, forwarded on through the global networks of NGOs. In the context of all this attention and excitement about the sudden appearance of this indigenous movement, the Mexican government was unable to pursue a military policy to destroy the EZLN.

Nonviolent Actions (Nv)

Nonviolent actions are often used to bring about and to resist political, cultural, economic, and other major changes.36 Sometimes participants in these nonviolent efforts, and often the resisting authorities, have resorted to violence as well. Participants in large-scale struggles employ a variety of nonviolent actions, combining different degrees of coercion, persuasion, and reward.37 For example, a demonstration in which protesters march and carry banners expressing their views is largely an effort at persuasion, but it may also convey some threats, perhaps of electoral opposition. Many such actions would be located about the point “Nv(1)” in figure 4.1. In most societies, such protests are regulated and government authorities may give or deny permission for demonstrations. And most, but certainly not all, demonstrations are carried out within authorized limits. Many demonstrations are rallies in support of one side in the struggle and may then be directed at intimidating the opponent.

More typically, nonviolent action refers to activities that have larger and more severe coercive components. This includes withholding goods or services, as in boycotts and strikes—located at point “Nv(2)” in figure 4.1. Such actions are often intended to communicate how important the goal is to those making the claim, and are executed in compliance with institutionalized rules.

Other nonviolent actions are based on noncompliance to laws that the challengers regard as unjust, such as laws upholding segregation between ethnic communities. Similar to reframing enactments, such noncompliance can be carried out in ways that disrupt or prevent those who practice segregation from doing so—located at point “Nv(3)” in figure 4.1. This was the case with battles to desegregate public accommodations in the U.S. South, waged by civil rights organizations during the early 1960s. Their actions had coercive components but embodied persuasive elements as well, since they were conducted in a manner to avoid hurting the people whose actions they sought to change, even at the cost of enduring violence themselves. The actions were presented as demonstrating the importance of ending segregation. The demonstrators expressed their view of segregation as immoral, but their demonstrating was done without hate and with the promise that once the segregated practices were ended, mutual benefits would follow.
Practitioners of nonviolent actions usually represent their efforts as not solely coercive, since they seek to persuade opponents of the mutual benefits in changing their objectionable conduct. The opponents are told, for example, that they will better satisfy their own value commitments to their country or to God.

Mahatma Gandhi developed a comprehensive approach to principled nonviolence in the struggle he led for the independence of India from Great Britain. His approach, termed satyagraha, or “truth force,” has been influential throughout the world. Three concepts are fundamental in satyagraha: truth, nonviolence, and self-suffering. For Gandhi, truth is God; it is an end we seek, but since we cannot know absolute truth, its pursuit excludes the use of violence. Nonviolence does not imply the negative action of not harming, but positive love, of doing good to the evildoer. It does not mean acquiescence to the wrong, but resistance to the wrongdoer, even if that does injure the wrongdoer. Self-suffering means a willingness to endure suffering, not out of weakness but out of courage to refrain from violence even when it is possible to use violence. It is directed at moral persuasion.

Other advocates and practitioners of nonviolent action argue for its use on pragmatic grounds, asserting it is effective and ultimately less costly in human life. They examine which strategies have contributed to reaching particular goals. Conflict analysts recognize that in actual struggles, violent actions often occur in conjunction with nonviolent behavior. Different organizations within each side may use alternative and often complementary nonviolent means, the mixture changing within the course of a given conflict.

Whether principled or pragmatic, some features of nonviolent strategies tend to foster constructively waged rather than destructively waged struggles. Certainly, the adversary tends to be less dehumanized by the process; indeed, nonviolent action often appeals to the empathy and reasonableness of the adversary. It can even garner respect from the adversary, often a goal of a people who have been viewed as inferior. As Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote in 1963 about the civil rights struggle, “The Negro’s method of nonviolent direct action is not only suitable as a remedy for injustice; its very nature is such that it challenges the myth of inferiority. Even the most reluctant are forced to recognize that no inferior people could choose and successfully pursue a course involving such extensive sacrifice, bravery, and skill.”

Nonviolent action often gains effectiveness by attracting support and allies who are impressed by the demonstration of commitment and the lack of generalized threat such action seems to convey. This may be seen in trade union organizing and strike efforts. In the 1960s, Cesar Chávez mobilized consumer boycotts against grapes to support the strike efforts of the National Farm Workers Association.

In international relations, economic sanctions are increasingly used and regarded as a nonviolent form of coercion. The suffering imposed on the general population and the limited effectiveness of sanctions have led to proposals to employ narrowly targeted or “smart” sanctions. Targeted sanctions are directed at decision makers and include freezing of financial assets, arms embargoes, flight bans, and travel bans. They effectively contributed to the step-by-step transformation of Libyan relations with the United States, having been applied for many years following the indictment of two Libyan officials for the terrorist bombing of the passenger airplane Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988.

**Terrorist Actions (Tr)**

Since the attacks in the United States of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing Global War on Terrorism waged by the U.S. government, a great many publications have sought to account for terrorism and to discuss how it can be countered. Yet there is no universal agreement about defining it. Persons identifying with the targeted people generally use the term “terrorism” pejoratively in order to condemn certain antagonistic actions by an enemy and to justify strong countermeasures. Such usage is relevant for understanding the course of many large-scale conflicts, but it hampers comprehensive analyses of the phenomenon.

The solution taken here is to start with a broad definition of terrorist actions, and then distinguish different aspects of such actions, which various groups use to label some of those actions as terrorist. A broad definition is: acts or threatened acts of violence in order to create fear and compliant behavior in a victim or audience for some collective purpose. Terrorism so defined fits in the coercion corner of figure 4.1. Various groups use particular qualities of such acts to further delimit what they judge to be “terrorism,” including qualities of the act, its target, the perpetrator, and the context of the actions.

For many people, to be designated terrorist, the actions must be unusually gruesome and frightening. This may mean not just killing someone, but desecrating the body and exhibiting the result. Thus, when the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) acted to restore white domination of African Americans in the U.S. South after the Civil War, KKK members publicly lynched African Americans. Bodies were left hanging from tree limbs and were sometimes mutilated.

We must consider which kinds of violent behavior are so outrageous and terrifying that significant numbers of people regard them as terrorist. Obviously, what people regard as abhorrent and beyond the conventional limits depends on their normative standards. The capacity of humans to commit atrocities and still believe they are acting properly certainly helps propel conflicts destructively.

Another aspect of violent actions that is often used to characterize terrorism pertains to the targets of the action. For collecting and analyzing data about terrorism, the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), at the University of Maryland, defines terrorism as “the intentional targeting of civilian, non-combatant populations.” Violent attacks on noncombatants are widely regarded as terrorism. This view is so widespread that violence directed against ordinary citizens and particularly children is likely to
be counterproductive for the perpetrators' cause. Particularly if an individual or small group commits such actions, they and their cause often are discredited, as happened after the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995.

On the other hand, a wide variety of military actions, such as shelling, bombing, setting booby traps, or planting landmines, if directed against warriors or other combatants, tend not to be regarded as terrorist even if many noncombatants are the victims. In contemporary warfare, rules have been established to limit civilian casualties and ill treatment of combatants, but violations of those rules, for example, by killing or starving prisoners, tend to be regarded as crimes or atrocities, but not terrorism.

For many groups, however, the target alone does not always distinguish violence as terrorist. Thus, even when noncombatants have been subjected to bombing in their homes and workplaces, and deprived of life-supporting necessities, those who order or commit the acts claim that they are defensive and are necessary to end the war quickly and therefore save lives. Terror bombing of population centers in Europe and Japan were prevalent during World War II and regarded by their perpetrators as legitimate, even if regrettable. Not surprisingly, the people in the societies subjected to those actions tended to regard the actions as terrorism.

Furthermore, the very notion of who is or is not a combatant is not always clear. Thus, when the naval vessel USS Cole was attacked in the harbor at Aden, Yemen, on October 12, 2000, and seventeen sailors were killed, the U.S. government and public regarded the action as a terrorist attack even though the target was military. This characterization of the attack was made because the al Qaeda network led by Osama bin Laden conducted the attack. Perpetrators of targeted killing of noncombatants sometimes justify their conduct by arguing that they are merely reciprocating such atrocities committed by the enemy or that the so-called combatants are actually combatants. For example, immediately after the 9/11 attacks, a senior al Qaeda operative who helped plan the attacks, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, defended them by denying that they were terrorism attacks:

They are legally legitimate, because they are committed against a country at war with us, and the people in that country are combatants. Someone might say that it is the innocent, the elderly, the women, and the children who are victims, so how can these operations be legitimate according to sharia? And we say that the sanctity of women, children, and the elderly is not absolute. There are special cases. . . . Muslims may respond in kind if infidels have targeted women and children and elderly Muslims [or if] they are being invaded [or if] the non-combatants are helping with the fight, whether in action, word, or any other type of assistance, [or if they] need to attack with heavy weapons, which do not differentiate between combatants and non-combatants.

The same complexities confound definitions of domestic terrorist actions. Governments usually regard violent attacks on police, soldiers, or civilians by organized opposition groups as terrorist actions. Such groups, waging a revolutionary or secessionist struggle, regard themselves as conducting a legitimate fight and using necessary violence. Noteworthy examples of such organizations include the Liberation Tigers of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Kurdistan Workers' Party of the Kurds in Turkey, and the Basque Fatherland and Liberty of the Basque in Spain.

Some governments also at times resort to widespread arrests and even imprisonment, torture, assassinations, and "disappearance" of presumed opponents. This may be done to prevent or to suppress challenging organizations. Such government actions are often conducted covertly and sometimes through unofficial militia groups. Such operations are generally regarded as "state terrorism," such as those carried out in the assassinations and disappearances of citizens in Argentina, Guatemala, and Chile. In the latter two countries, the terrorism was conducted by military regimes that seized power after democratically elected governments were overthrown with covert assistance of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency as part of the struggle against Soviet Communism. Terrorism also includes the massive killings, labor-camp incarcerations, and torture by "internal security" forces within Hitlerite Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union.

States also sometimes support and provide havens for organizations waging revolutionary or liberation struggles within other countries. The organizations may be too weak to wage large-scale violent or nonviolent campaigns in those other countries, but the support enables them to conduct occasional terror attacks. This was the case made during the Cold War in support of Soviet and U.S. covert conduct. It is also the case where a country provides a haven for organizations attacking military and civilian targets in a neighboring country. For example, this has reportedly been done at various times by Syria, Libya, Pakistan, and several other countries.

Another standard used to characterize violence as terrorist is the nature of the perpetrator. A defining feature of a state is that it holds a monopoly on legitimate violence. By this logic, when agents of the state commit violence under orders from above, they are engaging in warfare or police action, which cannot be classified as terrorism. This is evident in the definitions of terrorism adopted by various U.S. government agencies. The definition used by the CIA is contained in Title 22 of the U.S. code, Section 2656(f)(d):

The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatants by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

Nongovernmental actors, however, sometimes challenge the very legitimacy of a state. If they view a state as illegitimate and themselves as legitimate, then the state's use of violence is illegitimate, and perhaps criminal or terrorist. The authority of a state may be diminished in another way. Members of an organization operating transnationally or citizens of another country can more
readily reject obedience to the government of the country in which they are carrying out violent attacks.

Some individuals or groups may commit terrifyingly violent acts that are generally not regarded as constituting terrorism. This is the case, for example, for criminal gangs who terrorize people from whom they extort money. It is also true for individuals who are suffering severe mental illness and violently attack political figures.

Finally, the context of the violent actions also can affect whether or not the actions are regarded as terrorist. One aspect of the context is the degree of transparency shown by the persons committing the action. Some violent actions are covert; and the agents conducting the action deny carrying it out. This makes it difficult to understand what goals are being pursued or how the conflict might be settled. The mystery of who committed the violent activities often contributes to their terrifying quality. This was true with the appearance of anthrax spores in the U.S. mail in October 2001. Furthermore, people engaging in covert operations generally are able to act with little accountability and few constraints on perpetrating atrocities.

Another aspect of context is the degree to which the violence is part of a wide array of other methods of struggle. It may be incidental in a large-scale struggle in which various nonviolent methods are also being used, in which case it is less likely to be regarded as terrorist, while if it is the primary method of conducting a conflict, it is likely to be labeled terrorist.

Sometimes terrorism is conducted as if the perpetrators seek to persuade the targeted opposition of the depth of their feelings and the strength of their convictions. That may also enhance the intimidating character of the action, signaling that such actions will persist and cannot be prevented. Terrorist acts carried out by people who commit suicide in the process are an extreme example of such demonstrations of commitment and are honored by some people in whose name they die.

The extent to which the violent actions are carried out with the ultimate purpose to negotiate an agreement with the adversary is an additional aspect of the actions' context. Violent actions may even be used to gain the attention of the inattentive. A cause is being announced, and indeed, an audience is gained as people try to understand why such actions are taken. Various terrorist actions, then, may combine different degrees of coercive and persuasive inducements. Sometimes, however, terrorism seems hardly instrumental and not calculated to win concessions. Rather, it appears intended to punish the other side for its past wrong deeds. Insofar as the terrorist actions are punishing and revengeful, they may stiffen the enemy's resolve rather than achieve any desired change. Indeed, the terrorist acts may be largely expressive for some of the perpetrators. These qualities of terrorism tend to make struggles in which it is used more intractable and destructive.

Certainly, terrorism has existed throughout human history, even as its character and frequency have varied. In the twenty-first century, however, several new conditions provide new opportunities for nonofficial as well as official organizations to conduct terrorist activities. First, technological developments provide particularly effective and frightening ways to kill people. Not only have explosives become more powerful and delivery systems more precise, but also weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, have proliferated. Second, the rapid means of communication and transportation make transnational organizations able to function effectively and make organization structured into a network rather than a hierarchical form increasingly feasible, which makes their incapacitation more difficult. Third, the growing social and political integration of the world facilitates the movement of peoples and the ease of foreign people to fit into different societies. Fourth, the greater connectedness of communication systems enables information and images to spread rapidly throughout the world, increasing the impact of a terrifying event anywhere. Finally, the growing integration of the global economy increases its vulnerability to widespread disruption by breakdown at one link.

The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, exhibit many features generally characterizing terrorism. But they also demonstrate some novel features deriving from the new conditions of the twenty-first century. Members of the al Qaeda network assert their desire to return Muslims to what they claim to be traditional Islamic faith and practice. They utilize, however, the newest technologies to construct a transnational network for mobilizing personnel and funds and to conduct their violent activities. They adapt to local life in many countries to conduct covert activities as they prepare to execute their attacks. They select targets and attack them dramatically to maximize mass media attention and to frighten officials or those denounced as infidels, crusaders, and Zionists.

In short, terrorist actions vary immensely and there is no consensus about which actions deserve that label. Often, adversaries in intense conflicts attach the label terrorism to the other side's violent deeds. Although the discussion of terrorism in this book gives particular attention to nonstate perpetrators, violent deeds against noncombatants committed by government agents will not be ignored.

Coengagements (Ce)

Rewards are often part of a broad strategy in waging a conflict. In this section, I discuss one class of strategies that significantly entails offering benefits to the other side, and therefore is located in the reward corner of figure 4.1. The strategy is to establish an ongoing relationship in which the opposing sides engage in activities that promise shared benefits. These strategies include co-optation, corporate codetermination, and political power sharing. They are typically employed to help settle and transform conflicts and to prevent the eruption of destructive conflicts.

Phillip Selznick influentialy uses the term "co-optation" in his analysis of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Soon after President Franklin D. Roose-
velt's inauguration in 1933, the federal government established a public corporation to undertake a multipurpose river valley development program to produce electricity and provide water for irrigation. Groups and interests that might have opposed some of the developments were invited to participate in policy making and became supporters of the TVA.

Various forms of co-optation can be discerned in diverse settings. In some regards, programs undertaken in the United States under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 may be illustrative. As part of the government's War on Poverty, the act authorized community action programs (CAPs). Urban disorders and riots had begun to erupt, partly in conjunction with the civil rights movement. The CAPs were to stimulate local communities to mobilize resources in a coordinated attack on poverty and to do so by including the poor to participate in the "maximum feasible" extent. Indeed, poor persons did participate in the many local programs to alleviate poverty that were undertaken. Nevertheless, discontent rose and urban riots occurred widely in the late 1960s. The authors of the 1968 Kerner report on civil disorders noted the demand for greater grassroots engagement in directing the programs affecting low-income neighborhoods and racial ghettos. They concluded, "meaningful community participation and a substantial measure of involvement in program development is an essential strategy for city government."794

For many persons, co-optation has bad connotations, implying that a group seeking to improve its conditions abandons their aims, or settles for very little, and joins the dominant view. Co-optation may also refer to the actions of group's leadership, who soften their demands and derive personal benefits from the dominants. Indeed, a dominant group may make concessions in order win acquiescence in the future. Certainly, co-optation takes many forms and can have contradictory consequences. In general, there are risks of forgoing greater gains that might be achieved by further struggle rather than securing the gains already won by institutionalizing them.80

Within industrial organizations, efforts to ameliorate labor-management strife have included formal systems of worker engagement in management. For example, in the Federal Republic of Germany after World War II the trade unions sought codetermination, that is, worker representation in each company's board of directors and executive committee.81 This was achieved in 1951 in the coal and steel industries, and 1972 legislation extended worker representation to all companies with at least five workers.

Finally, one or another power-sharing arrangement may be instituted to settle and transform conflicts in a society rent by fighting along ethnic, religious, or language lines. Power sharing is a governance system that ensures representation of diverse groups in policy making and in administrative institutions, particularly in the police and military services.82 For example, in South Africa in 1994, the first elections in which people of all races could vote, major opposition parties were guaranteed that they would have a seat in the government and in the cabinet, for a transitional period, and would hold parliament seats proportional to their numbers in the population.

In Northern Ireland, the process of reaching a power-sharing arrangement acceptable to the major parties with a stake in the conflict between the Protestant and Catholic communities is illuminating.83 In 1968, the Catholic minority began a civil rights campaign against discrimination and for equality. The Royal Ulster Constabulary, the police of the Protestant-controlled government, forcefully broke up the peaceful demonstrations, which were also attacked by Protestant vigilante groups. The Irish Republican Army, which had been dormant, began to organize to defend the Catholic community and raised the old demand to reunite the island of Ireland. Thus the struggle intensified and the British government suspended the Protestant-controlled governing body and imposed direct rule from London. The British were unable to sustain a tentative power-sharing government when Protestant workers led a general strike. Then, in 1985 the British and Irish governments agreed to work together and this helped transform the conflict. Although violent fighting between armed groups continued, negotiations also continued and some agreements were reached, but did not endure. Finally, a comprehensive settlement, the Good Friday agreement, was achieved in April 1998 and gradually implemented with many stops and starts. The agreement consisted of three strands: proportional representation and power sharing in the North, a linked ministerial council between the assembly and Ireland, and British-Irish ties, consisting of a British-Irish council and a standing intergovernmental conference.

Problem-Solving Meetings (Ps)

The final strategy selected for particular attention here is engagement in meetings to exchange information in order to solve what may be regarded as a shared problem. This is an important mode of conflict resolution, but also a way to wage a conflict constructively.85 The essential features of the problem-solving mode are that members of the contending parties discuss the nature of their problem and their possibly shared responsibility; they propose various solutions, and consider ways to implement the mutually preferred solutions. The participants recognize the concerns of each other and seek ways in which those can be addressed in a mutually acceptable settlement. In this approach, adversaries are not viewed as unitary actors whose leaders are the only significant policy makers. As Harold H. Saunders writes, "The power of citizens is most fully realized and demonstrated in the capacity to build and change relationships."86

Problem solving is typically tried at an early stage of a conflict and at various points when the parties in conflict are seeking to de-escalate it. As with the strategies of nonviolent action and terrorist actions, problem solving may be carried out by official agents of the contending parties or by other members of the adversary camps. Unlike the previously discussed strategies, however, intermediaries often participate in problem solving, for example, as facilitators or mediators. Further, problem solving involves a joint decision-making process, rather than a unilateral imposition. In the last decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, many problem-solving conflict-resolution methods began expanding greatly. They include informal and formal exchanges and dialogues, as well as mediated problem-solving negotiations, NGOs spanning ethnic and other fault lines, and workshops facilitated by intermediaries. They have expanded, particularly as a result of experience with ethnic and other communal conflicts within one country and in protracted conflicts between countries. For example, facilitated workshops have been conducted with Catholics and Protestants from Northern Ireland, members of various religious communities in Lebanon, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Jewish Israelis and Arab Palestinians, and, following the war over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, with Argentinean and British representatives.61

Even workshops among persons who lack authority to bind their respective parties may contribute over time to the de-escalation and resolution of a conflict. Nongovernmental agencies may help inform influential people on each side about the concerns of their adversaries. The understandings and options generated may become vitally relevant when the circumstances have changed and an opportunity for official de-escalating efforts arises. Sometimes the people with workshop experience become part of the official problem-solving negotiations.62

In traditional competitive negotiations, in contrast, each party usually seeks to maximize its gain, often at the expense of the other side. Such negotiations usually involve an exchange of persuasive inducements, directed at changing the other side’s position. Although the negotiations sometimes include promises of benefits to the other side in exchange for benefits received, on the whole, each side takes a hard line, insisting on as much as it thinks it may get and threatening coercive consequences if it does not. Traditional negotiations may be accompanied by coercive actions, as when union-management negotiations are conducted while the union members are on strike.

In problem-solving negotiations, efforts are made to understand the interests or needs of the other side and to discover possible solutions that maximize all the parties’ goals. Mutual benefits result. Coercive inducements are minimized, but the negotiating parties may both anticipate losses if their search for mutual gain fails. Such problem-solving negotiations are located at point “P” in figure 4.1.

Figure 4.2 presents another way of conceptualizing the problem-solving conflict mode. An adversary’s approach to a conflict varies along two dimensions, concern for oneself and concern for the relationship.63 A low concern along both dimensions would be expressed by a conflict-avoidance approach. A high assertiveness and low cooperativeness orientation would be expressed by taking a competitive strategy. A low concern for oneself, but high concern for the relationship would be expressed as an accommodating orientation. Finally, a high concern in both dimensions would be characterized as a collaborating approach, including problem solving.

In official negotiations, no sharp dividing line between traditional competitive negotiations and problem-solving negotiations need exist. Although some negotiations are clearly traditional, many are mixed in character. For example, the disarmament negotiations in the 1950s between the U.S. and Soviet representatives had little problem-solving character: positions were stated and restated, largely for home consumption and to posture for a larger audience, but there was little effort to find options that might contribute to both sides’ interests or needs.64 On the other hand, at Camp David in 1978 between the Israeli and Egyptian delegations, mediated by President Jimmy Carter and the U.S. delegation, the negotiations had many attributes of a problem-solving approach.65

But a problem-solving mode is more likely to be used in domestic conflicts than in international conflicts. For example, it may be seen even in attempts to find accommodations among peoples with ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other communal differences within a single society. Often, the efforts include negotiations among representatives of the different communities to find a constitutional formula to solve the problem they face. This may be seen in the negotiations leading to the transition of power in South Africa from a white-ruled country to one organized on the basis of equality in political rights of all peoples.66 The problem-solving approach has also been advocated and utilized in labor-management relations.67

CONCLUSIONS

Each actor in a fight tries to use the conflict method it believes advantageous, and each is influenced by the choices made by the other. The adopted conflict strategies blend coercive, rewarding, and persuasive inducements, and these
are varyingingly regulated. The choices are confirmed, modified, rejected, and remade as the struggle continues, with different potentialities for destructive or constructive escalation. Each party alters its strategies as its goals evolve, as the other side responds, and as the environmental alters, all partly as a result of the previous choices.

The five kinds of conflict strategies discussed illustrate various ways inducements are combined. Obviously, there are many other kinds of conflict strategies, and several of these diverse strategies are employed at the same time as well as sequentially in the course of a conflict's history. This complexity is especially likely for conflict parties that are large and loosely coordinated. A party may be a broad coalition of organizations that is working toward similar goals, using different approaches, and acting in concert as well as in concert with each other. For example, the 1960s' U.S. civil rights movement included organizations using electoral political methods, judicial means, legal demonstrations, civil disobedience, and many other strategies and tactics.

Each major party in a large-scale conflict includes many subgroups, to some degree using different strategies with and against each other. Even in international conflicts between governments, nongovernmental and transnational organizations are often active, applying different strategies than those available to government officials. Moreover, governments include different departments and persons operating at different levels and engaging in different kinds of encounters with the adversary. This was evident, for example in the buildup to the 2003 war between the Iraqi and U.S. governments, its execution, and the aftermath.

NOTES


9. President Lyndon B. Johnson during the war against North Vietnam offered aid for reconstruction, linked to ending the war; but this was not wholly credible and in any case reflected a grave cultural and political misunderstanding. Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: New American Library, 1977), 278–82.

10. One definition that incorporates many shared ideas is that persuasion is "symbolic activity whose purpose is to effect the internalization or voluntary acceptance of new cognitive states or patterns of overt behavior through the exchange of messages." See Mary John Smith, *Persuasion and Human Action* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1982), 7.


